NOTES on Walter T. Stace (1886-1967): I am Determined and Free

STACE

Walter T. Stace (1886-1967) is an admirably clear writer. In his book Religion and the Modern Mind (1952), he addresses the issue of free will versus determinism. Although I believe that his argument is incorrect, nonetheless I can admire the way he presents his argument.

In the debate between free will and determinism, Stace attempts to hold a position in the middle. He believes that we are determined — but that nonetheless we have free will. Such a position is known as soft determinism and is distinct from hard (or extreme) determinism.

Baron d’Holbach is a hard determinist. He believes that all events are caused and that therefore there is no room for free will — not even for human beings. Stace, however, believes that we can call some of the causes that exist free will; thus, human beings are both determined and free.

Stace begins by writing about morality. Truly, free will is necessary for morality. Morality is concerned with what we ought to do. It makes no sense to tell someone that they ought to have done something different if what they did was compelled and they had no choice but to do it. Besides, ordinarily we assume that free will exists. After all, at the dinner table we ask our dining partners if they would like some of this or of that.

So whence does the controversy between free will and determinism arise? Stace answers that it arises from an incorrect definition of free will. People have assumed that free will means indeterminism; that is, an action is done from free will if that action is not caused. As we will see, Stace rejects that definition.

Since free will has been incorrectly defined, Stace writes, we need to come up with the correct definition of free will. Stace has a strategy for correctly defining free will. According to Stace, “… common usage is the criterion for determining whether a definition is correct or not.”

As an example, Stace asks us to imagine that someone has incorrectly defined Man as a five-legged animal. This person looks around the World, does not see any five-legged animals, and so concludes that Man does not exist. This conclusion is obviously false — all as a result of using an incorrect definition of Man. To reach a correct definition of Man, this person should ask other people what they mean when they use the word “Man.”

Stace proposes to use this strategy to discover the correct meaning of free will. He begins by collecting a number of free acts and a number of unfree acts, and he arranges them in the following table:

Free Acts

Gandhi fasting because he wanted to free India.
Stealing because one is hungry.
Signing a confession because one wanted to tell the truth.
Leaving the office because one wanted one’s lunch.

Unfree Acts

Fasting in the desert because there was no food.
Stealing bread because one’s employer threatened to beat one.
Signing a confession because the police beat one.
Leaving the office because forcibly removed.

In order to arrive at a correct definition of free will, Stace writes, we need to find out what characteristic the free acts have in common that the unfree acts do not. Once we have that particular characteristic, we will know what characteristic makes a free act free.

That characteristic is not that free acts are uncaused, Stace says. After all, one may go out to lunch because one is hungry, but one’s hunger is caused. As for Gandhi, Stace says, his desire to free India is caused by more complex causes than simple hunger. However, both one’s hunger and Gandhi’s desire to free India are caused by heredity and environment.

Instead, the characteristic that the free acts have that the unfree acts do not is that the immediate cause of the free acts is a psychological state in the agent (the doer). For example, a psychological state leads Gandhi to fast to make India free. As a result of this analysis, Stace arrives at the following definitions of free acts and unfree acts:

Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent.

Acts not freely done are those whose immediate causes are states of affairs external to the agent.

As a result of his analysis, Stace believes that the problem of free will versus determinism has been solved — or, rather, dissolved. It arose because of an incorrect definition of free will. Now that free will has been correctly defined, we can see that there is no problem.

Stace next attempts to answer three problems that his “deterministic free will” might encounter. First, he investigates acts whose immediate cause is a psychological state, but whose penultimate (next to the last) cause is an event in the external environment. For example, a criminal points a gun at you and tells you, “Your money or your life.” You take out your wallet and hand it to the criminal. Is this act free or unfree?

According to Stace’s definitions, this is a free act because the immediate cause is a psychological state within you. You hand over your wallet because of your fear of death. However, most people would say that this is not a free act. Stace calls this a “borderline case.” Occasionally, in real life things don’t always fit neatly into categories that we have defined; however, we should not let this upset us.

Second, since, according to Stace, acts of free will are predictable, isn’t this mixing of free will and predictability a futile effort to mix incompatibles? Stace’s answer is no. According to Stace, acts of free will are compatible with prediction. We may know a man’s character, and on the basis of this knowledge, predict that the man will act honorably. However, this does not take away from the man’s free will. The man could have acted differently if he had wanted to. However, then the causes acting on him would have different, and so he would have acted differently.

Third and finally, some people believe that Stace’s notion of a deterministic free will does away with moral responsibility. Stace denies that, as he believes that punishment is justified by determinism. According to Stace, there are two reasons for punishing someone, and both of them require determinism.

The first reason to punish someone is rehabilitation. A child tells lies, so to make the child stop telling lies, you spank the child. You have given the child a cause that will make the child stop telling lies. The second reason to punish someone is deterrence. If you want people to stop committing burglary, you can catch some burglars and throw them into prison. Other people who may want to burgle will realize that they could be caught and punished and so they will decide not to commit a burglary.

However, isn’t there a third reason to punish someone? Don’t we punish someone because he or she deserves to be punished? This person could have done the right thing or the wrong thing. This person decided to do the wrong thing, and so this person deserves the punishment he or she receives. For someone to deserve his or her punishment, that person’s actions must not be determined.

Now let us ask, Is Stace’s blend of determinism and free will successful? Can Stace avoid “hard” determinism? The answer to these questions must be, No. Stace defines free acts as “Acts freely done are those whose immediate causes are psychological states in the agent.” However, Stace admits that these psychological states are caused by heredity and environment. Because of this, Stace’s soft determinism collapses into hard determinism. There is no difference between Baron d’Holbach and Stace except that Stace calls some caused acts, acts of free will. But both philosophers believe that all acts are caused, and that whatever we do, we could not have done otherwise, because of heredity and environment.

Stace has apparently made an error in his definition of free will. Perhaps he has only part of the definition. After all, I can define a human being as a two-legged animal, but there is more to the definition of a human being than that. In common usage, we speak of a person deserving to be punished or to be praised. In order to be deserving, one must have had the freedom to do either the right thing or the wrong thing. So perhaps free acts are preceded by psychological states in the agent; however, perhaps another characteristic of free acts is that we are capable of acting differently than we did.

NOTES on Walter T. Stace (1886-1967): I am Determined and Free

Share this:

Like this:

Related

Leave a Reply Cancel reply

Blog Stats

Categories

Top Posts & Pages