NOTES on George Berkeley (1685-1753): Idealism

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George Berkeley (1685-1753) was a believer in Idealism, which denies the reality of physical matter. According to Idealism, reality is mental, not physical. In his Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, Berkeley argues against Materialism and for Idealism. Hylas defends the Materialist position and Philonous defends the Idealist position. In other words, Philonous defends Berkeley’s position.

Basically, Berkeley will argue that the only things we directly experience are ideas (redness, solidity, wetness, hotness, etc.). Since we do not directly experience any kind of underlying material substance, we cannot conclude that material substance exists. As you can tell, Berkeley is an empiricist — he believes that knowledge comes from the five senses.

In the Three Dialogues, Philonous’ (that is, Berkeley’s) main thesis is expressed: “… there is no such thing as material substance in the world.” This appears to go against common sense, as Hylas says, but Philonous is prepared to mount a defense of his thesis.

Before doing so, however, Philonous argues that his Idealism does not deny the principles and theorems of the sciences. Since these principles and theorems are “universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of matter,” Idealism does not deny them.

For example, according to The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia, “If during a time t a body travels over a distance s, then the average speed of the body is s/t.” There is no mention of matter here; the mathematical formula mentions “a body,” but both Materialism and Idealism can account for the existence of bodies. A Materialist will say that a body such as a red ball is a material object possessing the quality of redness, while an Idealist will say that a body such as a red ball is a bundle of ideas (that is, sensible qualities) that includes the quality of redness.

Philonous does what many good philosophers do at the beginning of their philosophical investigations; he defines an important term he will be using. Defining a term at the outset of a philosophical investigation can avoid misunderstandings later.

In this case, the term to be defined is “sensible things.” “Sensible” here means perceived by the senses — seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, and smelling. The definition that Philonous and Hylas agree to is “sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.” The things that we perceive by seeing include light, colors, and figures (shapes); by hearing, sounds; by tasting, tastes; by smelling, odors; and by touching, tangible qualities.

However, one thing that we cannot perceive by the senses is the cause of the things we sense. Thus, if I hear a sound, I perceive the sound by the use of the sense of hearing, but I cannot perceive the cause of the sound. For example, if I am on the street and hear a piano playing (but don’t see a CD player or a person playing a piano), I don’t know if someone is playing a CD tape of piano music or if I am overhearing someone playing the piano in their apartment.

Of course, I can use reason to deduce the cause of the sound I hear, but reason is different from immediately perceiving something by the use of the senses. In the case of the piano music, even if I see someone seated at the piano and moving his arms, I may be mistaken about the cause of the piano music if I use my reason to deduce that the person I see is playing the piano. It could a player piano and the person may be pretending to play the piano. (This happens in a scene from the 1971 movie Harold and Maude, starring Ruth Gordon and Bud Cort.)

To understand Berkeley’s ideas, you need to know what secondary and primary qualities are. Secondary qualities are those qualities (colors, tastes, sounds) that are produced in our mind by objects, while primary qualities are those qualities (size, shape, weight, motion) that are supposed to belong to the objects themselves.

Philonous is now ready to begin arguing that the qualities we perceive are qualities that are perceived by the mind and that these qualities do not exist in a material substance that exists outside the mind. He first argues that what are called the secondary qualities are like this, then he argues that what are called the primary qualities are also like this.

The first secondary quality that Philonous looks at is heat. According to Philonous, heat cannot exist outside the mind. Hylas, of course, argues that heat resides in a material substance and can exist outside the mind. However, Philonous points out that if we touch a very hot object, we will burn ourselves, and therefore, we will feel pain. Pain, of course, cannot exist without a mind to feel it, and a very hot oven — which Hylas would call a material substance — does not have a mind. Therefore, heat cannot exist without a mind.

Hylas objects to this reasoning by saying that heat and pain are two separate (distinct) sensations. However, Philonous responds by pointing out that when you place your hand in a fire, you don’t perceive two separate sensations. Instead, you perceive both pain and heat at the same time. Since the fire affects you with both pain and heat at the same time, it follows that the two are one idea.

Philonous has another argument to make to support the idea that heat cannot exist outside the mind. Put one of your hands near a fire, and hold ice in the other hand. After a couple of minutes, drop the ice and place both of your hands in a bucket of room-temperature water. One hand will feel the water as warm; the other hand will feel the water as cold. If Hylas is correct, and heat and cold do exist in a material substance, then it would follow that the water in the bucket is both warm and cold at the same time. But, Philonous says, that is an absurdity. It makes much more sense to believe that heat and cold cannot exist outside the mind.

In addition, Philonous points out, if you prick your finger with a pin, you will feel pain, just as if you would if you burn your finger with a hot coal from the fire. It doesn’t make sense to think of the sensation of pain as existing in a pin, and so it doesn’t make sense to think of the sensation of pain/heat as existing in a hot coal.

Hylas stops believing that heat and cold can exist without a mind to perceive them, and Philonous moves on to his argument that tastes cannot exist without a mind to perceive them. He states that tastes such as sweet and bitter are sensations. In particular, a sweet taste is a kind of pleasure, while a bitter taste is a kind of pain. Pleasure and pain are both things that are perceived by the mind, and it does not make sense to think that pleasure and pain reside in an unthinking material substance.

Once again, Hylas gives up his opinion; in this case, he stops thinking that tastes can exist without a mind to perceive them. Philonous also makes the argument that smells cannot exist without a mind to perceive them — it is similar to Philonous’ other arguments.

Philonous also argues that sounds cannot exist without a mind to perceive them. Hylas argues that sounds reside in the air. As an example, Hylas points out if you strike a bell in a vacuum, the bell will make no sound; therefore, the sound must reside in the air.

However, Philonous argues that sound is a sensation — when the sound waves strike the ear, we hear a sound. Of course, if sound is a sensation, then it cannot exist without a mind to perceive it. So, Hylas admits, “I had as well grant that sounds, too, have no real being without the mind.”

Philonous also argues that colors cannot exist without a mind to perceive them. Once again Hylas objects by saying that colors really reside in a material substance. However, Philonous points to some red and purple clouds (apparently, there is a beautiful sunset) and asks if the red and purple really reside in the clouds. Hylas answers, no, but then makes a distinction between real and apparent colors.

This distinction leads to problems. If some colors are real, and other colors are apparent, then how can we tell which colors are real and which colors are apparent? Suppose that we make a “most near and exact survey,” as Hylas suggests. Would that work? Philonous points out that the “most near and exact survey” would be with a microscope, but that microscopes often reveal colors that we cannot see with the naked eye.

In addition, Philonous points out, the eyes of animals are often different from our eyes. For example, cats can see very well at night, but we can’t. An example from the world of insects is that bees can perceive ultraviolet light, but we can’t. It is possible that the colors these other beings see are different from the colors we see.

In addition, a person who suffers from jaundice sees everything as yellow. In twilight or in weak light, everything looks grey. Plus, a prism shows us that light that looks white is made up of many different colors. Once again, Hylas gives up his opinion and agrees with Philonous that colors cannot exist without a mind to perceive them.

So far, Philonous has been arguing that secondary qualities cannot exist outside the mind. Next, he begins to argue that primary qualities cannot exist without a mind to perceive them.

Philonous argues first that the primary qualities of extension and figure (shape) cannot exist outside the mind. To do so, he uses the same kind of arguments that he used to show that secondary qualities cannot exist without a mind to perceive them. He points out that one person will see something as “little, smooth, and round,” while someone else sees it as “great, uneven, and angular.”

For example, the world of a child is much different from that of an adult. To a child, things are much bigger than they appear to an adult. Even common table utensils such as a spoon and fork are large and unwieldy to a child.

In addition, things often look one way to the naked eye, but another way when seen under a microscope. To the naked eye, something may appear very smooth, but when looked at with a microscope, the same thing appears very rough.

Once again, Hylas gives up his belief that extension and figure (shape) reside in a material substance. He sees that he has to agree with Philonous that extension and figure (shape) cannot exist without a mind to perceive them.

Philonous then argues that solidity cannot exist without a mind to perceive it. By solidity we must either have no sensible quality in mind or we must have hardness or resistance in mind. If we have no sensible quality in mind, we can ignore solidity, because we are investigating sensible qualities.

However, if by solidity we have hardness or resistance in mind, then we must acknowledge that these qualities differ according to the minds that perceive them. What seems soft to one person may seem rough to another. A poor peasant who wears rags may think a certain piece of cloth soft, but a princess used to fine clothing may think the same piece of cloth is rough.

At this point Hylas objects, “I own that the very sensation of resistance, which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the body, but the cause of that sensation is.”

To which Philonous replies, “But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived, and therefore not sensible.”

However, Hylas says that he finds it necessary to believe in a “material substratum,” without which the qualities “cannot be conceived to exist.” In addition, Hylas says that there are “two kinds of objects: the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called “ideas”; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas which are their images and representations.”

However, according to Hylas, these real things or external objects are perceived by sense, although they are not immediately perceived. This surprises Philonous, who asks for an example of a thing that is perceived by the senses but is not immediately perceived. Hylas’ example is a picture or statue of Julius Caesar. A person who sees a picture or statue of Julius Caesar is not immediately perceiving Julius Caesar, but when he sees a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, he nonetheless perceives Julius Caesar.

Philonous replies to the example by pointing out that all that is immediately perceived is some colors and a shape, and that this is all that a person who has never heard of Julius Caesar would perceive. A person who directs his thoughts to Julius Caesar after seeing the picture or statue does so only because of “reason and memory” and not because of perception. Therefore, we can continue to believe our original definition of sensible objects: “sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.”

And so our senses do not support belief in material substance or a material substratum. After all, as has been established earlier, we cannot perceive the cause of the sensations we perceive. If we are to conclude that material substance exists, it must be by the use of our reason.

Therefore, Philonous asks Hylas how he comes at his knowledge of material substance. Hylas is not able to answer, instead suggesting that Philonous must prove that material substance does not exist.

This is contrary to the usual rule of proof. If you believe that pink elephants exist and I do not, it is up to you to prove that pink elephants exist; it is not up to me to prove that they do not exist. The burden of proof lies on the person who makes the positive assertion (that something, such as material substance, exists), not on the person who makes the negative assertion (that something, such as material substance, does not exist).

But even granting that material substance exists, how are we to know which of the sensible qualities (ideas) we perceive will give us knowledge of that material substance? The color of an object varies. The shape of an object varies. (A chair’s shape will vary as you view it from different angles.) The roughness or smoothness of an object varies according to the person who is perceiving the object. How are we to know which sensible quality truly represents the material substance?

Moreover, according to Hylas, material objects are themselves insensible but are perceived by their qualities (ideas). But this does not make sense to Philonous because it must mean that something that is sensible is like something that is insensible. This is similar to saying that something that is invisible is like a color.

Some Important Points

As an empiricist, Berkeley believes that we acquire knowledge through the use of our senses. Since our senses do not show us that material substance exists, it must not exist. All the qualities we experience, we experience with the mind. Therefore, ultimate reality must be mental, not physical.
To those who say that we perceive matter, Berkeley would reply that we do not. When I look at a desk, I see brownness and I see a certain shape. When I touch the desk, it feels hard and smooth. But all of these qualities are perceived by the mind. I perceive these sensible qualities, but I do not perceive anything called matter.
Jay F. Rosenberg, in his book The Practice of Philosophy, writes about Berkeley’s method of philosophical reasoning. (He’s in favor of it.) See the sections “Lost Contrast” and “Emptiness” in the chapter titled “Five Ways to Criticize a Philosopher.”
Hylas believes in the existence of material objects; Philonous does not. In your opinion, which person is correct?

Note: The quotations that Berkeley that appear in this essay are from his book Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous.

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